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THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREE-
DOMS. Edited by WalterS. Tamopolsky1 and Gerald-A. 
Beaudoin.2 Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd. 1982. Pp. liii, 590. 
$57.50. 
Stephen Allan Scott3 
This symposium has as its purpose the exposition of what, at 
the time of its appearance, was a freshly enacted series of Cana-
dian constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms. On 
April 17, 1982, Canada became under its own internal law a sov-
ereign state independent of the United Kingdom. Through the 
Canada Act 1982,4 the United Kingdom Parliament (acting on a 
request made by both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, with 
the concurrence of the executive governments of nine of the ten 
provinces) brought the law into accord with the long-standing 
political reality. This final Imperial constituent act, with its asso-
ciated Constitution Act, 1982,s transfers constitution-making 
power from the United Kingdom Parliament to Canadian institu-
tions acting through a series of intricate constitutional-amend-
ment formulae. It also effects certain reforms in the distribution 
of the legislative authority between the Parliament of Canada and 
the provincial legislatures. Finally, it enacts a series of guarantees 
of rights and freedoms that appear in part I of the Constitution 
Act, entitled the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and 
in part III, entitled Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada. 
The fifteen contributors to the symposium (which, though now 
overtaken by two years of case law, retains much of its usefulness) 
deal with these constitutional guarantees. 
As the preface notes, the work (like the constitutional reform 
itself) appeared simultaneously in English and French. Six of the 
contributions (those of Professors Beaudoin, Blache, Chevrette, 
Garant, Morel, and Tremblay) were originally written in French. 
These, by and large, read very well in the English translations, 
I. Now the Hon. Mr. Justice Tamopolsky, of the Court of Appeal of Ontario. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. 
3. Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
4. 1982, ch. II (U.K.), proclaimed in force on that date; see Can. Gaz. Extra No. 20 
(Apr. 17, 1982) appearing also in 116 Can. Gaz. Pt. II, 2927-28. 
5. Canada Act 1982, sched. B. 
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and the reviewer has neither read the French version6 nor com-
pared it with the English. But the reader of these chapters should 
bear in mind the existence of the French originals, particularly 
when a given passage seems puzzling in English.? 
Five chapters (chaps. l-4, and chap. 16) discuss aspects of the 
Charter as a whole. The others deal with particular guarantees. 
I 
The general discussion of the Charter begins with Professor 
Peter W. Hogg's comparison (chap. 1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms with the Canadian Bill of Rights. Professor 
Hogg develops themes that reappear repeatedly in later analyses 
of particular guarantees. Particularly is this true of comparisons 
between the Bill and the Charter. For most of the authors the 
former casts a long shadow over the latter. Enacted by the Parlia-
ment of Canada in 1960 and applicable only to federal law, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights set forth a broad series of guarantees and 
provided: 
Every Jaw of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize 
the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms 
herein recognized and declared . . . . 8 
The Supreme Court of Canada indeed held in 1969 that the 
effect of this provision was to render inoperative federal laws that 
could not be reconciled with the guarantees of the Bill. In fact the 
Court struck down as offensive to the guarantee of "the right of 
the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the 
law and the law" (section l(b)), a federal statutory provision mak-
ing it an offence for an Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve.9 (By 
6. CHARTE CANDIENNE DES DROITS ET LIBERTES (G.-A. Beaudoin & W. Tamopol-
sky eds. 1982). 
7. For instance, in the course of Professor Morel's discussion of double jeopardy in 
chapter 12, the author speaks of res judicata in criminal matters, and notably the pleas of 
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. "Commentators have long asked whether the provi-
sions of the Criminal Code do not restrict availability of the plea to criminal acts." The 
phrase "criminal acts" appears in the French version as "actes criminels," which is the 
technical equivalent of "indictable offence." 
8. Part I of An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 8-9 Eliz. II, S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
9. R. v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R.3d 473 (1970), which struck down section 94(b) of the 
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, ch. 149, at least as to the Northwest Territories, where the facts of 
the Drybones case arose, and where-a// law being federal-all liquor Jaws, whether they 
be applicable to Indians or to non-Indians, are alike enacted under the authority of the 
Parliament of Canada. Thus any differentiation of treatment results directly from federal 
legislative action and not (as in the provinces) from a contrast between federal and provin-
1985] BOOK REVIEW 223 
contrast, the territorial liquor ordinance, of general application to 
the population of the Northwest Territories, where the case arose, 
punished only intoxication "in a public place" and also carried 
less severe penalties.) After this initial judicial intervention, how-
ever, the Court consistently refused to find conflicts between fed-
eral legislation and the Bill's provisions. Majorities repeatedly 
found, after examination that usually was at best superficial, that 
challenged legislation was properly enacted in pursuance of a 
"valid federal objective," in effect applying what in the United 
States would be minimum-level scrutiny or less.w 
Moreover, section 1 of the Bill opened with the statement 
that: "It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there 
have existed and shall continue to exist ... the following human 
rights and fundamental freedoms . . . . " On several occasions 
the Court said that the Bill created "no new rights"; therefore pre-
existing federal legislation could not be inconsistent with its terms. 
Pre-Bill legislation, when challenged, would thus itself become the 
very standard against which it was to be tested. In other words, 
the response to the challenge would be circular. Of this Professor 
Hogg writes: 
This theory, which would have robbed the Bill of much of its force, was never 
consistently applied, and is contradicted by the decision in R. v. Drybones (1969) 
because the discriminatory provision struck out of the Indian Act in that case had 
been in the Indian Act long before 1960. Still, the frozen concepts theory kept 
ciallaws. This qualification does not appear explicitly in the Drybones judgment, but may 
be implicit in later decisions of the Court, where it was said that violations of the equality 
guarantee did not arise simply because the federal Parliament dealt with matters under its 
jurisdiction differently from the way in which some or all provinces dealt with matters 
under their jurisdiction. 
Both the ordinance and the Indian Act imposed maximum fines of $50, but only the 
latter provided for a minimum fine (of $1 0). Both pieces of legislation also carried liability 
to imprisonment, but whereas the maximum under the ordinance was thirty days, the max-
imum under the Indian Act was three months. In fact, Drybones' conviction under the 
Indian Act arose because of his intoxication in the Old Stope Hotel (quaere, a "public 
place" within the meaning of the ordinance?) and his sentence was a fine of $10 and costs, 
or, in default, three days in custody. On the facts, it seeffiS probable that a conviction could 
have been entered under either piece of legislation, and clear that, on conviction, the same 
sentence could have been imposed under either, and this, whether the offender was or was 
not an Indian. 
10. For a notable exception, see the concurring opinion of Beetz, J., in A.G. Canada 
v. Canard, 1976 S.C.R. 170, 194, 204-08. A majority of the Coun concurred in the order 
proposed by Beetz, J., which disposed of the appeal on essentially jurisdictional grounds, 
on the basis that the panicular relief claimed by Canard in reliance on the Canadian Bill of 
Rights ~uld not be granted against the relevant panies unless upon fresh proceedings 
brought m the Federal Coun of Canada. This made it, strictly speaking, unnecessary to 
deal with the Bill; but all the opinions delivered did nevenheless deal with the effect of the 
Bill. That of Beetz, J., reviews the earlier decisions, and analyzes the issues involved in a 
special Indian status with great care and balance. 
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appearing from time to time as a ground of decision in other cases, and has never 
been squarely laid to rest. 
Professor Hogg's prognostication seems to be one of cautious 
optimism: 
The Charter scrupulously avoids references to existing or continuing rights 
which could form the basis of a frozen concepts theory. That theory therefore 
should not bedevil the interpretation of the Charter, although no doubt under the 
limitation clause of the Charter the prior state of the law in Canada will be a 
relevant factor in considering whether a particular law can be "demonstrably jus-
tified in a free and democratic society". 
This last-quoted phrase refers to section 1 of the Charter, 
which provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon·strably 
justified in a free and democratic society." Section 1 in effect re-
sponds to the history of the Bill with an attempt to ensure that, 
whenever prima facie the rights guaranteed by the Bill are in-
fringed, the legislation or other governmental action affecting 
those rights will be closely scrutinized by the courts. The trend of 
the case law appears so far to point to the success of the 
provision.tt 
A number of contributors rely on the differences in formal 
status between the Bill and the Charter as a basis for more active 
judicial enforcement of the latter. As Professor Herbert Marx12 
very reasonably notes, however, "[l]ogically, similar or identical 
sections in the Charter and the Bill should receive a similar 
interpretation." 
The Bill, at least in appearance, was an "ordinary" act of the 
Parliament of Canada, while the Constitution Act declares the 
Charter to be a formal part of the Constitution of Canada. Fur-
thermore the Bill was (and is generally assumed still to be) repeal-
able by an ordinary federal statute, while the Charter is 
amendable only by the "bilateral" and "multilateral" constitu-
tional amendment procedures.tJ Even the late Chief Justice Las-
II. See, e.g., Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of 
Censors, 5 D.L.R.3d 766 (Ont. C.A. 1983) and Re Southam Inc. and the Queen, 146 
D.L.R.3d 408, 419-20 (Ont. C.A. 1983). 
12. Professor Marx, on leave from the University of Montreal, is a member of the 
National Assembly of Quebec; that is, the single House of the Quebec Legislature. 
13. Parliament's new power of unilateral constitutional amendment (section 44 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982) is framed in much narrower terms than that of section 9l.l of the 
amended 1867 Act 31, in force when the Bill was enacted. This could, at least arguably, 
affect Parliament's power, since April 17, 1982, to repeal or amend the Bill. 
The "unanimous consent" procedure (Constitution Act, 1982, section 41), is not gener-
ally required for an amendment to the Charter (but compare§ 14(c) with e.g., §§ 16(1), 
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kin, who as a rule insisted that the Bill was a "quasi-constitutional 
enactment"I4 demanding more stringent scrutiny of federal law 
than a majority of his colleagues were willing to exercise, retreated 
on one occasion to the position that "compelling reasons ought to 
be advanced to justify the Court in this case to employ a statutory 
(as contrasted with a constitutional) jurisdiction to deny operative 
effect to a substantive measure duly enacted by a Parliament con-
stitutionally competent to do so."Is In other words, a more mod-
est judicial role was appropriate than if the Bill had been truly 
"constitutional." 
With these precedents, it is all too easy for courts and judges 
to distinguish the Charter from the Bill in the way envisaged (if 
not necessarily approved) by several contributors to this volume, 
and to conclude that what was not, under the Bill, a denial (say) of 
freedom of speech or of equality before the law, has become so 
under the Charter. But it would be quite wrong to countenance 
such a justification. The Bill was validly enacted by the Parlia-
ment of Canada, and Gust as the Charter does now) prevailed 
over other inconsistent federal laws whether previously or even 
(semble) subsequently enacted. Moreover, it is idle to disparage 
the Bill as lacking "constitutional" status. In its legal character 
the Bill was no different from a very large part of the Constitution 
of Canada. Many rules of the common law, and many statutory 
enactments, were at the time when the Bill was enactedi6 fully 
17(1), 18(1), 19(1), 20(1)). It would nevertheless clearly be available for this purpose-both 
by reason of section 4l(e) and because compliance with section 41 would (at least nor-
mally) constitute compliance a fortiori with the other amending procedures. Professor 
Hogg argues that the "general" amending procedure (section 38) would be available. As a 
rule that seems true, though in some instances section 43 would be available and perhaps 
obligatory. See§ 43 and co"V'are § 43(b) with, e.g.,§§ 16(2), 17(2), 18(2), and 19(2). And 
in some instances section 41 would be obligatory. See§ 4l(c). 
14. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a half-way house between a purely common 
law regime and a constitutional one; it may aptly be described as a quasi-constitu-
tional instrument. It does not embody any sanctions for the enforcement of its 
terms, but it must be the function of the Courts to provide them in the light of the 
judicial view of the impact of that enactment. The Dryhones case has established 
what the impact is, and I have no reason to depart from the position there taken. 
Hogan v. R., 1975 S.C.R. 574, 597-98 (Laskin, J., dissenting). See also Miller v. The 
Queen, 1977 S.C.R. 680, 690 (Laskin, J., concurring); A. G. Canada v. Canard, supra note 
10, at 205 (Beetz, J., concurring). 
15. Curr v. R., 1972 S.C.R. 889, 899. Here a unanimous Court held, for various rea-
sons, that drivers' compulsory breath test for alcohol was not a denial of "the right of the 
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law" (section I (a) of the Bill), nor of 
protection from self-crimination (section 2(d)), nor of any other guarantee. The reasons of 
Justice Laskin, as he then was, were those of a majority of the Court. 
16. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch. 3, § 91.1 (U.K.), as added 
by the British North America (No.2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.), and repealed by 
the Constitution Act, 1982, § 53(1). 
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part of the Constitution of Canada, and many still are,t7 and not 
the less so because of being subject to amendment or repeal by 
simple federal statute. The Bill, in truth, was no less "entrenched" 
than these many provisions formally described as "constitu-
tional," but unilaterally amendable by federal act.•s In certain re-
spects the Bill was in fact more entrenched than these portions of 
the Constitution, in that it required express words to enact opera-
tive laws inconsistent with its guarantees. In the reviewer's opin-
ion, Parliament in enacting the Bill acted well within its then-
existing power to amend unilaterally the Constitution of Canada 
in respect of federal parliamentary institutions.t9 It did so by pre-
scribing a particular manner and form requisite for certain legisla-
tion: federal statutes offensive to the guarantees of the Bill were 
required to declare expressly that they were to operate "notwith-
standing the Canadian Bill of Rights."2o It is surely little short of 
frivolous to suppose that anything turns on the fact that the Bill 
was not styled "constitutional"; and pointless, too, to debate 
whether it is appropriately described as "constitutional," "quasi-
constitutional," or "nonconstitutional." 
The symposium's "general" chapters deal with a number of 
other major issues involving the Bill or comparisons with the Bill. 
For instance, Professor Hogg argues that the Bill is in effect par-
tially repealed by the Charter; that is to say impliedly repealed by 
supersession insofar as the operation of the Charter is identical 
with that of the Bill. The reviewer, with respect, is unpersuaded. 
First, there is a presumption against implied repeal. Next, the 
Charter is an Imperial, and the Bill a federal, enactment: the in-
tention to supersede should be especially clear. Third, on Profes-
sor Hogg's argument, it would appear that no single provision of 
the Bill is, for all purposes,21 superseded. We are then, surely, 
17. Constitution Act, 1982, § 44. 
18. Indeed, these portions of the Constitution of Canada were, and are, vulnerable in 
principle even to repeal by implication. See McCawley v. The King, 1920 A. C. 691 (P.C.); 
Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1978 S.C.R. 1198, 1291 (Pigeon, J., for a majority 
of the Court, indeed contrasts sections 53 and 54 of the British North America Act, 1867 
[now, the Constitution Act, 1867] with the Canadian Bill of Rights). 
19. This is true, in the reviewer's view, on a grammatical construction of the then 
section 9l.l of the Constitution Act, 1867 (as the act is now known). The results achieved 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament of 
Canada to Alter or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R.3d I (1979) were achieved despite the 
terms of section 91.1. 
20. See section 2 of the Bill. 
21. For instance, sections I and 2 of the Bill must on Professor Hogg's reasoning 
survive for purposes of scrutiny by the Minister of Justice of draft legislation (section 3). 
Indeed, Professor Hogg goes so far as to argue that the common law, and pre-Confedera-
tion statute law, are not subject to the Charter. The reviewer does not agree with this 
proposition; but, assuming it to be true, it affords another important sphere for the contin-
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well short of the conditions sufficient for implied repeal in their 
classic summary by Rt. Hon. Dr. Lushington in India (No. 2): 
What words will constitute a repeal by implication it is impossible to say from 
authority or decided cases. If, on the one hand, the general presumption must be 
against such a repeal, on the ground that the intention to repeal, if any had ex-
isted, would have been declared in express terms; so on the other, it is not neces-
sary that any express reference be made to the statute which is to be repealed. 
The prior statute would I conceive be repealed by implication, if its provisions 
were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one, or if the two statutes together 
would lead to wholly absurd consequences, or if the entire subject-matter were 
taken away by the subsequent statute. Perhaps the most difficult case for consid-
eration is where the subject-matter has been so dealt with in subsequent statutes, 
that, according to all ordinary reasoning, the panicular provision in the prior stat-
ute would not have been intended to subsist, and yet if it were left subsisting no 
palpable absurdity would be occasioned.22 
Much eclat (this volume included) has accompanied the in-
troduction of the Canadian Charter: so much so as to leave the 
impression that the Canadian Constitution has been virtually rev-
olutionized by the enactment of comprehensive guarantees fully 
binding the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the prov-
inces. Such an impression is, unfortunately, very far from the 
truth. Section 33 of the Charter, which has become known as the 
"override" clause, enables Parliament or a provincial legislature 
to exclude at will the operation of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the 
Charter, which contain most of the guarantees of fundamental 
freedoms, such as freedom of conscience and expression, the right 
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, and so forth. All that is 
required to exclude these guarantees is that Parliament, or the 
provincial legislature as the case may be, declare in an act "that 
the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a pro-
vision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." In 
that event, the statute "shall have such operation as it would have 
but for the provision of this Charter referred to the declaration." 
Such a declaration is subject to a five-year sunset rule and expires 
on any earlier date specified, but may thereafter be reenacted, 
whereupon the reenactment becomes itself subject to the sunset 
rule. 
This legislative override is in part the topic of Professor 
Marx's useful essay, and references to it recur in the other contri-
ued operation of sections I and 2 of the Bill, which, undoubtedly, do apply to the common 
law _and pre-Confederation enactments still in force in Canada and subject to repeal by 
Parliament. See sectiOn 5(2) of the Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
22. (1864] 33 L.J. (P.M. & A.) 193, 193-94 (Adm.). 
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butions, notably that of Professor Hogg. The reviewer's feeling is 
that Canadian legal scholars, not excluding the contributors to 
this volume, generally underestimate the significance of the over-
ride. Thus Professor Hogg writes of the sunset feature that it "re-
inforces the already powerful political safeguards against an ill-
considered use of the power." 
In truth, on May 5, 1982-barely weeks after the coming into 
force of the Charter and about the time this volume appeared-
the government of Quebec introduced into the legislature a bill 
entitled An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982. As 
amended, it was passed by the National Assembly, and received 
royal assent on June 23, 1982, becoming chapter 21 of the Statutes 
of Quebec, 1982. This act in substance reenacted all previous 
Quebec statutes with the addition of an override clause: 
This Act shall operate notwithstanding the provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of 
the Constitution Act 1982 (Schedule B of the Canada Act, chapter II of the 1982 
volume of the Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom). 
Although this act has itself been challenged, its validity was 
sustained at trial, and it is indeed difficult to see upon what 
ground it could be struck down.2J Moreover, since June 23, 1982, 
every public general act of the legislature of Quebec, however in-
nocuous, has contained a similar override clause. The result is of 
course that most of the Charter is, for all practical purposes, waste 
paper at the provincial level in Quebec. Quebec's use of the over-
ride proves that the guarantees of the Canadian Charter will be 
unavailable precisely when they are most needed. Nowhere in 
this volume has this truth been recognized. 
Use of the override is thus far more than a mere speculative 
possibility. A legislature desiring to override fundamental free-
doms may well be fortified, rather than deterred, by the very pub-
lic opinion that led to Alberta's legislative attempts to control 
newspaper discussion of Social Credit doctrine24 or Saskatche-
wan's statute barring white females from residing in, working in, 
or (with limited exceptions) frequenting places of business or 
23. Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. Dube et le Procureur du Quebec, Supe-
rior Court, Montreal, No. 500-05-004093-835, coram Deschenes C.J.;judgment of April27, 
1983; reported in an English translation sub nom Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. 
A.G. Quebec, 5 D.L.R.4th 157 (Que. S.C. 1983). An appeal is pending. On this issue, see 
the reviewer's discussion in Entrenclunent by Executive Action: A Partial Solution to "Legis-
lative Override,"4 S.C. L. Rev. 303 (1982), reprinted in THE New CoNSTITUTION AND THE 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS 303 (Belobaba & Gertner eds. 1982). 
24. See Reference re Alberta Legislation, 1938 S.C.R. 100. The Alberta Accurate 
News and Information Act was struck down by the Court as part of a legislative scheme 
intruding upon exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to banking. 
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amusement owned, kept, or managed by Chinese.2s 
The want of realism in what the symposium says (or more 
accurately does not say) about the legislative override-even the 
blithe assumption that Quebec laws would be left subject to chal-
lenge under the Charter-struck the reviewer as, quite frankly,26 
Polyannish. 
Yet the Quebec's response to the Charter was an entirely pre-
dictable reflex reaction of its Parti Quebecois government. When 
the federal executive government and the nine provincial govern-
ments (excluding Quebec) reached their 1982 accord on the com-
promise package that would go forward for enactment by the 
Parliament at Westminster, a principal new element was the over-
ride power. On that evening, the reviewer, reluctant to comment 
on an unseen text, visited the Canadian Press news services offices 
in Montreal as details of the accord came through on the telex, 
and immediately ventured the prediction that the Parti Quebecois 
would insert an override clause into every statute. Why? First, on 
principle, to express rejection of the Canadian federation in gen-
eral and, in particular, of a constitutional reform to which it had 
not agreed (though it gave the "eight provinces" including Quebec 
most of what they had sought). Second, by making exercise of the 
override commonplace, to render the public insensitive to its use 
and ensure that no special attention was called to any particular 
legislation in which it might be employed. 
And why was the override part of the compromise package? 
In its majority decision of September 28, 1981, on the Patria-
tion Riference,27 the Supreme Court of Canada held that, legally, 
the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament survived intact 
and unimpaired; that is, it could validly and effectively legislate 
on the Canadian Constitution on its own motion or in response to 
any request. But the Court also held that extralegal "conven-
tions" existed, rendering constitutionally improper a federal par-
liamentary approach to the Imperial Parliament without a 
sufficient provincial consensus. Whatever the necessary "consen-
sus" might be, the Court held that the two provinces of Ontario 
and New Brunswick, which alone supported the then federal pro-
posals, including full entrenchment of constitutional guarantees, 
did not suffice. 
Even if it had remained politically possible for federal parlia-
25. SeeQuong Wing v. The King, 49 S.C.R. 440 (1914), an unsuccessful challenge of 
this statute quoad employment. 
26. See, e.g., Professor Garant, on the right to representation by counsel. 
27. Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, 1981 S.C.R. 753. 
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mentary majorities to force the federal measure as it then stood 
through both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, it was at best 
doubtful that the government of the United Kingdom would (even 
perhaps that it could) carry such a bill through the Parliament at 
Westminster. 
A negotiated settlement became the only solution. The oppo-
sition to full entrenchment of constitutional guarantees varied in 
tenacity amongst "the eight provinces," that is, those other than 
New Brunswick and Ontario. In the case of Manitoba under the 
Conservative government of Hon. Sterling Lyon, and Quebec 
under the Parti Quebecois government of Hon. Rene Levesque, it 
was intransigent. 
The result was the November 5, 1981, negotiated "consensus" 
of the federal government and nine provinces (all save Quebec), 
which contained the override provision. This compromise be-
tween legislative sovereignty and entrenchment of basic rights 
seemed almost designed to underscore the cliche that in all mat-
ters situates Canada halfway between the United Kingdom 
(which of course has no constitutionally entrenched guarantees) 
and the United States (whose Constitution guarantees a wide 
range of fundamental freedoms). 
At the same time, the very fact that this semi-entrenchment 
was the result of several years of heated national constitutional 
debate gave the compromise the stamp of an exercise of the Cana-
dian national will. The country had clearly and deliberately de-
fined, among other things, the constitutional role of the judiciary. 
It is surely this fact (coupled with the differences in language dis-
cussed above) that will cause the judiciary to take the guarantees 
of the Charter more seriously than it has taken those of the Bill, if 
still with a good deal of caution. The facts that, unlike the Char-
ter, the Bill was not nominally part of the Constitution and that it 
was a federal rather than an Imperial statute, are explanations of 
the probable difference in judicial approach only in the sense of 
being convenient rationalizations, but not in the sense of being 
justifications. Still less are they sound causal conjunctions. 
Three problems, not unrelated, as to the Charter's scope of 
application recur in these essays. First, are rules of the common 
law and pre-Confederation enactments subject to the guarantees 
of the Charter? Second, are exercises of the royal prerogative -
that is to say, common-law powers of the executive - subject to 
review? Third, what application does the Charter have to private 
action? 
On the first point, Professor Hogg, giving as examples the law 
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of defamation and that of contempt of court, argues that this 
corpus of law is not subject to review under the Charter's guaran-
tees. Yet, Professor Beckton in her treatment of freedom of ex-
pression appears to assume the opposite in her discussion of the 
same two branches of law. 
The issue is difficult and delicate. The former position would 
tend to produce haphazard and even unjust results, while the lat-
ter position is not easily reconciled with the language of section 
32(1): 
32. (I) This Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within 
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Ter-
ritory and Northwest Territories; and 
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
Yet section 32 need not be construed as exhausting the scope of 
the Charter. Indeed, at least in some Canadian jurisdictions the 
reception of the common law now rests wholly or partly on stat-
ute. Furthermore section 52( 1) is completely general in rendering 
"of no force or effect" any law that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.2s 
Professor Hogg rightly argues that the references in section 
32( 1) to the "government" subject the exercise of the royal prerog-
ative to review under the Charter. Professor Katherine Swinton, 
whose essay on the Application o.f the Canadian Charter o.f Rights 
and Freedoms is specifically concerned with section 32, proposes a 
"governmental function" test that seemingly would cover a good 
deal of prerogative action. In the recent case of Operation Dis-
mantle Inc. v. The Government o.f Canada, four out of five mem-
bers of the Federal Court of Appeal considered, and three upheld, 
application of the Charter to the exercise of the prerogative in 
matters of defense. The Court nevertheless dismissed the plain-
tiffs' action to restrain the testing of air-launched cruise missiles in 
Canada, on the ground that the government of Canada was not 
thereby affecting the plaintiffs' right to life and security of the per-
son, merely through such impact as these missiles might have on 
international relations.29 As Operation Dismantle shows, simply 
because exercises of prerogative powers are in principle review-
able, it does not follow that the courts will automatically find con-
28. See the opinion of LeDain, J.A., as he then was, in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, 49 N.R. 363, 375 (F.C.A. 1983), relying in particular on the 
French version of section 52(1 ). 
29. Id Messrs. Justices Pratte, Ryan, LeDain, and Marceau considered the issue, 
with Messrs. Justices Pratte, Ryan, and LeDain upholding application of the Charter. 
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stitutional rights to have been even prima facie infringed. And 
even when they have been prima facie infringed, the rules of the 
common law conferring the relevant discretion may nevertheless 
survive scrutiny under section 1 of the Charter. 
The consensus of those participants in this symposium who 
consider the matter is that the Charter controls legislation and 
other governmental action, but not private conduct. Opinions to 
this effect may be found in the essays of Professor Hogg, Professor 
Swinton, and Professor Chevrette. The reviewer reads Professor 
Dale Gibson as dubitans. In principle, the reviewer shares the 
consensus view. The Charter, however, suppresses laws that do or 
omit to do certain things, such as laws denying the right to secur-
ity of the person. So the Charter can indirectly, where appropriate, 
accomplish results comparable to those that would obtain it if did 
impose obligations on private persons. For example, the Charter 
may not create a civil cause of action for assault, but could still be 
read as precluding any law that denies such a right of action. 
Nevertheless, the state is not of course responsible for all that it 
does not prevent. Otherwise, everything done or omitted by any-
one would become arguably state action and as such subject to 
legal control through the Constitution. The danger -and Ameri-
can experience shows it to be real- is an attempt at indiscrimi-
nate extension of the category of state action to embrace private 
individuals and corporations with consequent governmental con-
trol through the judicial branch. 
II 
Eleven chapters deal with the Charter's substantive guaran-
tees. Exposition of the guarantees calls for grammatical analysis 
of their language, consideration of the history of the relevant 
branches of the law in Canada and elsewhere, comparison with 
constitutional guarantees and constitutional jurisprudence in Ca-
nada and other countries, and identification and weighing of the 
competing policy considerations. Inevitably, different authors 
strike different balances. Some range far afield indeed: the final 
chapter contains references to the constitutions, among others, of 
Tuvalu, Kirbati, and Vanuatu. 
For the most part, these contributions on the "substantive" 
guarantees struck the reviewer as at v.:orst workmanlike an~ at 
best imaginative and thought-provoking. The more detailed 
Charter provisions seemed easiest to come to grips with; and the 
reviewer, after reading the chapters dealing with them, felt "on 
top of' their subjects: Professor Pierre Blache on The Mobtlity 
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Rights, Professor Franeois Chevrette on Protection Upon Arrest or 
Detention and Against Retroactive Penal Law, Professor Ed 
Ratushny on The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process, and 
Professor Morel on Certain Guarantees of Criminal Procedure. 
There also are useful accounts of rights pertaining to the political 
process by Professor Gerald Beaudoin in The Democratic Rights; 
dealing with The Language Rights, by Professor Andre Tremblay; 
and treating of The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples 
of Canada, by Mr. Justice Kenneth Lyskyk (as he now is). 
The general language of some of the basic guarantees 
presents a special challenge. Professor Clare Beckton's tour 
d'horizon of the position under the laws of Canada, Britain, the 
United States, and under the European Convention, alerts one to 
the problem areas and possible solutions relating to freedom of 
expression. Her treatment of controls upon election expenditures 
has proved especially timely, if in the event somewhat cautious. 
On July 13, 1984, just as a federal election was getting under way, 
Mr. Justice Medhurst in the Alberta Queen's Bench dramatically 
struck down federal provisions designed to prevent persons other 
than candidates, their agents, and registered political parties from 
expending money during electoral periods to promote or oppose 
the election of registered political parties or candidates.Jo The leg-
islation reflected Parliament's apprehension about the impact of 
single-issue organizations on the electoral process. 
A central guarantee is that of section 7 of the Charter, which 
secures to everyone "the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice" (my emphasis). 
No scheme to entrench fundamental rights can be meaningful 
without such a safeguard: the most brutal police state is otherwise 
entirely compatible with the constitution. It is not too much to say 
that section 7 is the general and comprehensive guarantee, while 
all the others in the Charter are particularizations. 
By a stroke of irony, it appears to have been the first provi-
sion of the Charter to be considered by the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada, and the only one to be addressed before his recent death by 
the late Chief Justice Laskin. The Supreme Court, in Westendorp 
v. The Queen,31 struck down, as an infringement of exclusive fed-
eral legislative authority over criminal law,32 a municipal an-
tiprostitution by-law, enacted under purported provincial 
30. National Citizens' Coalition Inc. et al. v. A.G. Canada, No. 8401-01295. 
31. 1983 S.C.R. 43. 
32. Section 91.27 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
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statutory authority. Counsel also relied on section 7 as an alterna-
tive ground of appeal, but then abandoned the argument, after 
what was rumored to have been a very unfriendly reception by the 
late Chief Justice. What appears in the report is this: 
It appeared in the course of argument that counsel for the appellant not only 
sought to infuse a substantive content into s. 7, beyond any procedural limitation 
of its terms, but also to rely on s. 7 to challenge the validity of the by-law provi-
sion without accepting as a necessary basis for the s. 7 submission that it could 
only apply if the by-law was to be taken as valid under the distribution of powers 
as between the legislating authorities. In the result, counsel for the appellant 
abandoned the challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Soliciting in the public street for purposes of prostitution is 
perhaps not the activity with the strongest claim for protection as 
a constitutionally protected liberty. But it is another matter alto-
gether to deny (as Chief Justice Laskin apparently implied) any 
substantive protection under section 7 to life or liberty. Aside 
from its purpose, the very language of section 7 demands a sub-
stantive character by speaking separately of the "right to life, lib-
erty and security of the person" and the right to procedural 
fairness. There is, with respect, no "procedural limitation of its 
terms." Chief Justice Laskin's response to counsel's reliance on 
section 7 as a substantive guarantee was undoubtedly one of his 
Lordship's various reflexes of American inspiration. Yet in the 
United States the aversion to "substantive due process" seems 
simply to have been a historical reaction to a perceived abuse of 
that doctrine. 
Professor Patrice Garant's interesting essay on Fundamental 
Freedoms and Natural Justice--essentially an analysis of section 
7-touches only obliquely on the issue of whether this guarantee 
is of a substantive character. Although some of his observations 
appear to presuppose a substantive character to section 7, the re-
view did not discern a clear conclusion on this central question. 
The most intractable challenge for a court is surely deciding 
what is required by a guarantee of equality of legal treatment. It 
is scarcely surprising that equality issues caused the greatest diffi-
culty for the courts under the Canadian Bill of Rights, and that 
the equality guarantee of the Charter (section 15) comes into oper-
ation only three years after the general effective date of the Char-
ter (section 32(2)). The very choice of any subject of legislation 
virtually ensures disparate treatment of persons with moral claims 
to similar treatment. Professor (now Mr. Justice) Walter Tarno-
polsky treats sections 15, 27, and 28 of the Charter in The Equality 
Rights. The discussion is largely a careful compte rendu of Can~­
dian, British, and American experience-very useful as far as tt 
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goes, but without the special insights that the author could have 
provided had he chosen a more jurisprudential approach. No 
one, however, can doubt the author's personal commitment to 
equality of treatment in practice. His proposition that "anyone 
who would like to use a particular language meaningfully is not 
helped by guarantees of free speech: she/he needs others who can 
understand her/him and communicate with her/him" is followed 
shortly by the statement: "It may be that the government is re-
quired to have civil servants who can comprehend the language of 
the citizen and reply to him/her in his/her language." 
Professor Irwin Cotler, known for his active dedication to the 
advancement of human rights in many countries, was perhaps too 
ambitious in attempting to deal in a single chapter with freedom 
of assembly, association, conscience, and religion. Although these 
subjects are related, the first two or the second two topics would 
have afforded ample matter for a single contributor. The resulting 
seventy-eight pages profoundly disappointed the reviewer, as they 
seemed, among other things, diffuse and wanting in clarity and 
coherence. 
A closing word on general editorial matters. Typographical 
errors were not infrequent. More seriously, readers-particularly 
in the United States-should be warned that the appendices are 
unreliable reprints of the primary legal documents. Appendix I 
purports to be the Canada Act 1982, but is actually the text (im-
perfect even at that) of the motion for the federal parliamentary 
joint address requesting enactment of the Canada Act. The text 
appended to this volume contains several mistakes and imperfec-
tions (for example, reference to the "Constitution Act, 1981 ") and 
is any event incomplete (without disclosing the fact). (The Impe-
rial act as assented to, and as published by authority in London-
which is the only reliable text-was perhaps not available when 
this symposium went to press, but the U.K. Commons bill might 
probably have been procured, and printed avowedly as such.) 
Lastly, several authors-particularly those from Quebec-quite 
properly compare the French and English texts of the Charter in 
the course of their analyses. Where enacted texts in both lan-
guages are authentic, publishers do a disservice to their readers by 
reproducing them in one language only, as occurred here in the 
appendices. 
